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CHAPTER  6 
To Grasp Cognition in Action, 
Combine Behavioral Experiments with 
Protocol Analysis 
Charlotte Reypens and Sheen S. Levine 
ABSTRACT 
With behavioral experiments and protocol analysis, researchers can capture cognition in action. Using behav-
ioral -experiments, they can study realized behavior, not -perception or self-reports. And they can do that in a 
controlled laboratory environment to establish causality, curbing spurious -relationships. With protocol analysis, 
a method to elicit decision-makers’ thoughts, researchers can tap into cognitive processes. In combination, the 
two methods offer a novel approach to grasp mental processes alongside behavior, to reach causality and rep-
licate findings. We describe the methods, demonstrate how researchers can apply them, and share practices 
from the design of experimental instruments to the replication of findings. 
Keywords: Experiment; protocol analysis; cognition 
he greatest challenge is one of measurement,” concluded -Hodgkinson and Healey (2008, p. 387) after 
reviewing the research on cognition in organizations. Understanding managerial cognition may be 
paramount (Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002), but researchers must contend with methodological chal-
lenges when attempting to identify, isolate, measure, and grasp mental processes related to organiza-
tions. 
To address those challenges, we suggest grasping cognition in an environment that simulates managerial 
decision-making, but with controls that facilitate clarity and allow determining causality. We present two meth-
ods: behavioral experiments and protocol analysis, the latter being a technique to elicit thought processes and 
use them as data (Ericsson & Simon, 1984).1 By combining both methods, researchers can capture cognition in 
action: They can observe realized behavior while simultaneously documenting cognitive processes. And, be-
cause data are collected in a controlled environment, researchers can untangle cause and effect to identify cau-
sality and offer predictions—the ultimate goal of science (Popper, 1959, 1963). The simple setup also eases rep-
lication, a much-needed feature when “the truth is under attack,” as Levine (2012) alerted (also see Bettis, 
Helfat, & Shaver, 2016; Lewin et al., 2016). 
Cognition refers to “processes of knowing, including attending, remembering, and reasoning; also the con-
tent of the processes, such as concepts and memories” (American Psychological Association, 2009; also see 
Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Levine, Bernard, & Nagel, 2017). In most human settings, let alone organizational ones 
with all of their complexity, a multitude of variables affect behavior and decision-making. So, researchers who 
wish to understand cognition need to identify relevant variables, examine relationships between them, and final-
ly—pinpoint the cognitive processes underlying observed outcomes. Yet, students of management and organi-
zational cognition face at least three methodological challenges when attempting to do so: capturing underlying 
“T
cognitive processes, establishing causality, and ensuring validity. 
Nowadays, analytical techniques are aplenty: from ANOVA and regression in its many flavors to data mining 
(Bruce & Kristine, 2008, p. 15) and content analysis, typically of managerial documents such as letters to 
shareholders (e.g., Nadkarni & Chen, 2014). All can identify correlations between variables—but they are nec-
essarily silent on the underlying cognitive processes, because such processes cannot be pinpointed by correla-
tional methods, however statistically sophisticated. Thus, correlational methods should be complemented with 
techniques that can capture the underlying processes, such as experiments and protocol analysis. 
Even more than the sheer number of variables involved, the interactions between variables frustrate re-
searchers attempting to understand complex relationships (Sommer & Loch, 2004). A multitude of individual and 
context factors are intertwined, blurring the link between these factors and the outcomes of decisions and out-
comes. Thus, even after relevant variables have been identified, a researcher must disentangle links between 
them and distinguish mere correlation from causality. As Colquitt (2008, p. 616) acknowledges, “inferring causal-
ity is one of the most difficult aspects of scientific research,” so he proceeds to recommend, in an editorial pub-
lished in the Academy of Management Journal, to study behavior in a controlled setting—a laboratory. There, 
mechanisms can be tested, outcomes isolated, and alternative explanations controlled, so that causality can be 
determined (Cook, Campbell, & Day, 1979; Mill, 1883). 
A researcher may succeed in identifying variables and determine the relationship between them, but how 
can she ascertain that her findings are valid? In recent years, we have been reminded how research often deliv-
ers findings that are irreproducible, and possibly false (Butler, Delaney, & Spoelstra, 2017; Chang & Li, 2015; 
Tsang & Yamanoi, 2016). Researchers have long warned that a large share of research findings (or even most; 
Ioannidis, 2005) is false, and recent gigantic replication projects have confirmed this suspicion, for example, in 
economics (Camerer et al., 2016), psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), and cancer research 
(Begley & Ellis, 2012). In management, Goldfarb and King (2016, p. 168) estimate that two in five research re-
sults, or 40%, are not replicable. Bergh, Sharp, Aguinis, and Li (2017) report worse. Findings that cannot be rep-
licated may not be true, so replication is essential to the scientific effort, now featured in the editorial policies of 
leading scholarly journals (Bettis et al., 2016; Desai, 2013; Eich, 2014). Arie Lewin, Founder of Organization 
Science and The Journal of International Business Studies, took a step further: In a recent editorial, he and a 
group of editors advocate recognition for researchers who make their instruments and data publicly available 
and for those who register their hypotheses and analysis plan before embarking on a study (Lewin et al., 2016). 
Yet, if replication of a study is prohibitively difficult or expensive, it is unlikely to be pursued, so findings can nev-
er be substantiated (Agarwal, Croson, & Mahoney, 2010). A method that can be easily and cheaply replicated is 
a method that can help science advance. 
To address these challenges, we propose, researchers of managerial and organizational cognition will bene-
fit from a blend of behavioral experiments and protocol analysis. This mix of methods can help researchers ob-
serve cognition alongside behavior, in a way that is replicable. Behavioral experiments enable the study of real-
ized behavior in a controlled environment, supporting the causality and replicability of research findings. When 
combined with protocol analysis, researchers can simultaneously tap into various cognitive processes that un-
derlie observed behavior. In the next section, we describe both methods and suggest how they can help re-
searchers identify underlying processes, establish causality, and test for replicability. We end by illustrating how 
researchers can apply both methods, using examples from our own work. 
How Experiments and Protocol Analysis can Benefit Cognition 
Research 
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS: THE USE OF VERBAL REPORTS AS DATA 
K. Anders Ericsson, an expert on expertise, and Herbert Simon, an expert on almost everything, developed 
a method to elicit participants’ thought processes and use their verbal reports as data—protocol analysis. 
Although researchers have been collecting verbal protocols since the early twentieth century, Ericsson and 
Simon (1984, 1993) provide a much needed guide to reliably use such protocols as data. Before that, re-
searchers used protocols to study phenomena such as problem-solving (Simmel, 1953) or children’s devel-
opment (Hanfmann & Kasanin, 1937), often assuming that protocols automatically reflect cognitive pro-
cesses. In Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data, Ericsson and Simon draw on theories of cognitive and 
interpretive processes to guide how verbal reports can be collected and interpreted systematically. When 
these guidelines are followed, “thinking aloud” does not interfere with participants’ ability to think or their 
performance, according to the empirical evidence reviewed by Ericsson and Simon (1984, 1993). In a re-
cent meta-analysis of 94 studies that adopted the technique, Fox, Ericsson, and Best (2011) confirm this 
observation. 
Protocol analysis has applications in psychology, for example in understanding motivational processes 
(Robie, Brown, & Beaty, 2007); and in marketing, as in studying the usability of a product or service (Li, 
Daugherty, & Biocca, 2001). In management, Payne (1976) used the technique in studying information pro-
cessing under varying levels of task complexity, examining how people search for alternatives, evaluate 
them, and choose an option. In another application of protocol analysis, Isenberg (1986) asked general 
managers and undergraduates to verbalize their thoughts while solving a business case, allowing him to 
compare problem-solving between both groups. Likewise, Lee and Puranam (2015) used the technique to 
contrast experts and novices in organizational design. Clark, Li, and Shepherd (2017) collected verbal pro-
tocols from managers to examine foreign market selection. Recently, protocol analysis appeared in entre-
preneurship research: Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, and Wiltbank (2009) used it to compare how expert and 
novice entrepreneurs make decisions. Baron and Ensley (2006) and Grégoire, Barr, and Shepherd (2010) 
used it to study the reasoning processes of entrepreneurs as they recognize opportunities (or miss them). 
We also recognize an opportunity: Researchers who rely on protocol analysis can identify and interpret a 
range of cognitive processes. 
To collect protocols, participants verbalize their thoughts as they are performing a task. They are asked 
to “think out loud” while focusing on the task at hand. Participants are not asked to explain their 
thoughts—just to verbalize them as they emerge. During the verbalizing process, participants search their 
minds to report what they are thinking (Gould, 1999). Verbal reports can be collected during the task (con-
currently), after (retrospectively), or both. When protocol analysis is conducted concurrently—as we de-
scribe here—qualitative data are created in real time, avoiding hindsight and recall bias (Golden, 1992). 
Verbal protocols are audio-recorded and then transcribed (Ericsson & Simon, 1984, 1993). Since partici-
pants report their thoughts without explaining them, it is the researcher’s task to interpret the verbal reports and 
distill cognitive processes. To guide the researcher’s analysis of verbal reports, qualitative or quantitative data 
analysis software can be used. Analysis of these reports supports the identification of key variables and, more 
importantly, the underlying cognitive processes that influence behavior. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENTS FOR CAUSALITY AND REPLICABILITY 
The experimental method has helped researchers advance science for centuries. In the 17th century, Isaac 
Newton used the method to show that white light consists of colors, disproving the common belief that white light 
was colorless (Newton, 1999). In a series of experiments, he passed white light through a prism, which dis-
persed the light into a spectrum of colors. To rule out that these colors were created by the prism, he used a 
second prism and let the red light from the first prism pass through it. Newton observed that the red color re-
mained unchanged, so he concluded that the prism did not create the colors but separated the colors that were 
already present in the light. 
In the 19th century, Louis Pasteur conducted an experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness of his vaccine 
against anthrax, an infectious disease that was affecting cattle (Stokes, 1997). He compared two groups of ani-
mals: one group was vaccinated, and the other served as a control group and was left unvaccinated. One month 
after the vaccination, the animals were injected with live anthrax bacteria. Only the animals that were vaccinated 
survived, offering causal evidence that Pasteur’s vaccine protected animals against anthrax. 
Such causality is the gold standard in science, and cognition is no exception. In the study of cognition, ex-
periments can assist in establishing causality by allowing researchers to study behavior while controlling for 
confounding factors (Cook et al., 1979). McGrath (1982) contrasted several methods to conclude that experi-
ments allow researchers to maximize the precision of research findings and draw causal inferences. At the same 
time, he acknowledges that good researchers weigh external validity to ensure their findings are generalizable. 
Likewise, Schwenk (1982, p. 214) noted that some (poorly designed) laboratory experiments can seem too artifi-
cial, not a good representation of the world outside the laboratory. Over the years, several studies have illus-
trated how carefully designed experiments that represent decision-making in organizations can provide relevant, 
generalizable findings (e.g., Ederer & Manso, 2013; Hodgkinson, Bown, Maule, Glaister, & Pearman, 1999; 
Levine et al., 2017). 
In what ways can experiments benefit cognition research? First, researchers can rely on observed, rather 
than assumed, individual-level inputs and outcomes. In contrast to research that relies on noisy real-life data or 
proxies, experiments allow for a direct test using clean, observable measures, especially of individual behavior 
(Croson, Anand, & Agarwal, 2007). Second, individual traits and behavioral outcomes can be measured sepa-
rately. This removes recall bias (Golden, 1992) and common-method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Pod-
sakoff, 2003), both of which can undermine evidence from interviews or surveys. In contrast, experiments allow 
for individual traits to be measured separately from decisions, so researchers can assess how one influences 
the other. 
Third, next to fixed individual traits, experiments can capture dynamism, such as evolving experiences. Ra-
ther than using static measures, such as those taken at the beginning or a task or after an event happened, in 
the laboratory participants’ behavior can be measured repeatedly, allowing for insights into longitudinal behav-
ioral patterns, for example, of team decision-making over time (Håkonsson et al., 2016). Finally, experiments 
allow for easier replication, both in the lab and in the field (Maner, 2016). Once an experimental design has been 
developed and publicly shared (as it should be), others can use the materials and procedures to collect data in 
various samples. Such exact replication is more difficult with other methods, such as surveys or case studies, 
because researchers lack control over various industry- or organization-specific factors that may interfere with 
research findings (Croson et al., 2007). As mentioned above, replication helps safeguard against false positives 
and addresses validity concerns, which is why it has become key in many research areas including management 
(Bettis et al., 2016; Lewin et al., 2016), economics (Camerer et al., 2016), psychology (Open Science Collabora-
tion, 2015), and marketing (Desai, 2013). 
COMBINING EXPERIMENTS WITH PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
Each of the methods has strengths and weaknesses—yet in combination they yield unique benefits to students 
of cognition. Most importantly, they allow researchers to capture cognition alongside realized behavior, in a way 
that is replicable. Ericsson and Simon (1998, p. 181) advise that for protocol analysis to be successful, partici-
pants should be focused on the task at hand without distractions. A controlled lab environment offers such condi-
tions, supporting the collection of reliable protocols. 
When combined with protocol analysis, experiments can become a platform for theory building (Colquitt, 
2008); they are useful even when sufficient exploratory research is not yet available (Schwenk, 1982). In an ex-
ploratory laboratory study, researchers can collect verbal protocols alongside experimental data to gain insights 
into a range of cognitive processes, thereby supporting theory building. Collecting data from verbal protocols, 
followed by series of experiments at separate points in time, is an example of combined theory building and the-
ory testing. Specific variables of interest that are identified during protocol analysis can be tested by conducting 
experiments with or without protocol analysis, at various points in time and in different samples. Combining ex-
ploratory and confirmatory methods is a disciplined manner of conducting research (Fiske, 2016) and prevents 
questionable practices such as hypothesizing after the results are known (HARKing; Kerr, 1998) or selective re-
porting (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Levine, 2012). 
Putting Behavioral Experiments and Protocol Analysis to Work 
To illustrate, we describe combining protocol analysis with experiments to concurrently identify cognitive pro-
cesses and observe their effect on behavior. We elaborate on our research process, from the design of experi-
mental instruments to the replication of research findings. 
DESIGNING RIGOROUS EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENTS 
To benefit from the unique advantages of experiments, the right use of experimental instruments is crucial. To 
show that white light was not colorless, Newton used prisms as an experimental instrument to observe how light 
disperses into colors. In cognition research, experimental instruments can come in many forms. As Anderson, 
Herriot, and Hodgkinson (2001) recommend, both rigor and relevance are key in the design of these instru-
ments. To achieve both, the instrument should carefully match the theoretical features of the studied phenome-
non while reflecting managerial decision-making in organizations. 
In one study, we were interested in documenting differences in people’s behavior under ambiguity and ex-
plaining them: Was it luck (Denrell, Fang, & Liu, 2014)? Emotions (Ashkanasy, Humphrey, & Huy, 2017)? Risk 
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)? Such questions would be difficult to answer in organizational settings, 
where issues such as endogeneity, hindsight bias, and social desirability bias lurk. So, we created an experi-
mental task that simulates managerial decision-making, complete with an ambiguous environment, performance 
feedback, and iterative decisions. To a participant, the task was a realistic-looking landscape, drawn on a tab-
letop board, and said to contain hidden oil fields (Fig. 1). The participant’s task: Recover as much oil as possible 
in 20 decisions. Each decision was simply where to drill. After each decision, the participant learned how many 
oil reservoirs she recovered in a chosen drilling location. Then, the participant chose again and decided between 
drilling in a known location, drilling in a nearby region, or jumping to an unexplored part of the landscape. From 
the instructions (Appendix), participants knew that the oil reservoirs tend to be clustered, so the participant was 
aware that when she chose to stay in a nearby area, she could expect similar amounts of oil. 
To design the task, we studied decision-making under uncertainty (Alchian, 1950; Knight, 1921), search on 
rugged landscapes (Billinger, Stieglitz, & Schumacher, 2013; Kauffman & Levin, 1987), and the explora-
tion–exploitation trade-off (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010; March, 1991). Per Knight (1921), the task was 
ambiguous because a participant had only limited information about the outcomes: She did not know how the oil 
was distributed or what the maximum or minimum oil availabilities were. Thus, there was no optimal approach 
(Alchian, 1950)—the participant could only learn from past experiences. The distribution of oil reservoirs mir-
rored a rugged landscape (Kauffman & Levin, 1987), with peaks of high oil availabilities that were separated by 
valleys of low availabilities. Throughout the task, the participant faced the exploration–exploitation trade-off, de-
scribed by March (1991): Sticking with the tried and true by drilling in a known location or pursuing the new and 
promising, by searching for a new location. As March (1991,  
p. 71) formulated, the trade-off arises because decision-makers are constrained in time and resources, so they 
cannot pursue both strategies at once. Similarly, in our task, the participant only had 20 rounds to drill and could 
not explore and exploit at the same time, but each round chose on a continuum between exploration and exploi-
tation—a design following the suggestions of Lavie  
et al. (2010) and Mehlhorn et al. (2015). 
The experimental design matched theoretical characteristics and has proven its practical relevance: It re-
flects decision-making in countless managerial situations. For example, our experimental task aptly evokes the 
tension managers face when they choose between the following range of options: repeating a successful strat-
egy or initiating strategic change; working with the same partners or forming new partnerships; and marketing 
current products or investing in the development of novel ones. Apart from its managerial relevance, the task 
also enjoys high face validity (Nevo, 1985): its purpose is clear and easy to understand for participants. 
We created a second task to examine how decision-makers’ preferences for risk—and separate-
ly—ambiguity (also known as uncertainty) affect behavior in the oil drilling task. We captured these preferences 
in a second instrument so that we could separate measures of individual characteristics, behavior, and perfor-
mance, avoiding common-method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Starting with a task used in a neuro-economics 
study (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005), we revised it into a web-based instrument (Fig. 2). In it, a 
participant made 48 decisions; for each, she chose between a sure but low pay, and a higher but risky or am-
biguous one. The instrument was designed following Knight’s (1921) taxonomy, distinguishing between risk and 
ambiguity. In risky situations, probabilities of outcomes are known; in ambiguous situations, they are not. So, in 
the risk treatment, participants knew the probabilities of receiving a higher payment. In the ambiguity treatment, 
such probabilities were unknown. 
Fig. 2 shows a sample screen of the kind of choices participants made. With each choice, a participant could 
choose a red or blue card — or she could choose to receive a sure payment. Above the cards, a participant saw 
how many cards were in each deck. Below the cards appeared the number of tokens they would earn if they 
chose a color that matched the color of a randomly drawn card. On the right, the participant could see how much 
she would earn if she chose to receive a sure payment. 
The example (Fig. 2(a)) shows two decks, one of 10 red cards and one of 10 blue cards. If the color 
chosen by the participant matched the color of a randomly drawn card, she would earn 10 tokens. If the 
color the participant chose differed, she would earn nothing. If the participant chose a sure payment, she 
would earn three tokens. In the ambiguity example (Fig. 2(b)), there are 20 cards, some of them red and 
some of them blue, but the participant did not know how many of each color. Again, the participant chose 
between red, blue, or a payment for sure. In the risk example, the participant knew the number of red and 
blue cards in the deck, so the probabilities of receiving a higher payment were knowable. In the ambiguity 
treatment, participants only knew the total number of cards in the deck, with no way of knowing the proba-
bility of receiving a higher payment. 
As part of the design of experimental instruments, researchers should also decide on an appropriate incen-
tive scheme for participants. For their participation, participants may receive monetary incentives, such as cash, 
or non-monetary incentives, such as a custom report that delineates a participant’s characteristics based on her 
decisions. We chose to offer participants a monetary incentive. We did not offer a fixed fee but used an induced 
value approach (Smith, 1976), where participants’ decisions were paid depending on the decisions they made. 
In the oil-drilling task, the amount of oil participants accumulated was converted to money. In the risk and ambi-
guity task, participants were paid for their choice in one randomly drawn round. Because participants’ decisions 
directly affected their ultimate pay-off, participants were more likely to think carefully about the task to maximize 
their performance. 
Selecting an appropriate incentive scheme merits attention, because it may influence participants’ behavior 
in a task. For example, when participants are paid depending on their performance, they may take fewer risks 
than when they receive a fixed fee, to avoid harming their pay-off (Ederer & Manso, 2013). Researchers there-
fore should make sure the incentive scheme is aligned with their study purpose. 
PREPARING FOR DATA COLLECTION 
After designing experimental instruments, researchers can start preparing for data collection. First, experimental 
materials including the instruments, recruitment messages, and consent form should be submitted for approval 
to an institutional review board or equivalent ethic committees. 
Before data collection starts, it is helpful to develop an experimental protocol: a document that provides a 
step-by-step overview of the experimental procedure. The protocol ensures that data is collected in a standard-
ized way to facilitate the replication of the experimental procedure at another point in time or at different research 
sites. The protocol should therefore contain sufficient details so that other researchers can independently exe-
cute the same experimental procedure. 
COLLECTING DATA IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT 
Once ethical approval is obtained and a detailed experimental protocol is available, researchers can recruit par-
ticipants and invite them to a laboratory session. Experimental sessions often take place in a computer labora-
tory, where dozens of participants can simultaneously take part in an experimental task, individually or in groups. 
When experiments are combined with protocol analysis, sessions should take place in a quiet location, with only 
one participant per session, to facilitate the “think aloud” process. 
Our experimental sessions took place in a conference room, one participant at a time. As the participant ar-
rived, she signed an attendance sheet and read consent information. After obtaining consent, the experiment 
started. To avoid order effects, each participant completed both experimental tasks in a random order. The par-
ticipant read instructions and answered comprehension questions. If a participant failed at least one of these 
questions more than once, she was dismissed without participating. In our experience, 20–35% of the partici-
pants fail comprehension questions. Including these questions therefore is crucial to avoid noise in the data. 
Before the task started, the participant was asked to “think out loud” during the experiment. As recommend-
ed by Ericsson and Simon (1984), the participant first did an exercise to familiarize herself with the process. The 
experimenter announced: “During this part of the experiment we ask you to think out loud as you are making 
your decisions. First, let’s do an exercise: Please look around the room and say out loud what you are thinking 
right now.” Once the participant felt comfortable verbalizing her thoughts, the experimenter confirmed: “just do 
the same during the experiment and say out loud whatever you are thinking.” 
During the experiment, the experimenter reminded the participant: “please think out loud,” “feel free to say 
what is on your mind,” and “what are you thinking right now?” At the end of the task, the participant reflected on 
her overall experience during the task by answering open-ended questions: “What was your overall impression?” 
and “How did you try to make decisions?” With participants’ consent, all sessions were audio-recorded. 
When a participant asked questions about the content of the experiment, she was referred to the instructions 
but not given any additional information. Immediately after the experiment, the participant was paid and con-
firmed her participation by signing a check-out form. After the session, the experimenter recorded all questions 
and events, however minute, in an experiment log. This included all questions from participants, any other verbal 
exchanges with the participants that deviated from the experimental protocol, and all other events, such as when 
a participant showed up late, left the room during the task, or disagreed regarding her payment. 
ANALYZING RICH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DATA 
The combination of objective experimental data with subjective thought processes yields a rich data set of quali-
tative and quantitative data. In our case, the data set included 1,140 drilling decisions and 2,736 risky, ambigu-
ous, or sure choices made by 57 individuals. Transcriptions of participants’ verbal reports resulted in 14,563 
words, an average of 256 words per participant. 
Because we collected data in a controlled environment, we could create clean, observable measures of 
participants’ behavior. For example, our outcome of interest was search behavior. For each drilling spot a par-
ticipant chose, we calculated the Euclidean distance between that drilling spot and the previous drilling spot as 
a measure of exploration–exploitation. Low values indicate that a participant chose to exploit the local neigh-
borhood where expected outcomes were similar, whereas high values indicate exploration, a jump to an area 
where outcomes were unknown. To measure participants’ preferences for risk, and separately for ambiguity, 
we created a profile for each participant based on the repeated decisions she made in the risk and ambiguity 
instrument. 
Next to these objective measures, we analyzed participants’ subjective thought processes. To assess the 
validity of the protocols as data, we checked participants’ concurrent and retrospective thought processes for 
inconsistencies. Because we collected thought processes alongside realized behavior, we could also directly 
assess inconsistencies between the two. To interpret and explain thought processes, we manually coded each 
transcript. Following recommended qualitative coding techniques (Miles & Huberman, 1984), we first read 
through each transcript and created codes that closely matched the words participants used when they reported 
their thoughts. 
Then, we grouped these codes and created overarching codes. For example, codes such as “makes sense,” 
“method,” and “pattern,” were grouped into the higher-level code “logic.” Codes such as “play safe,” “bet,” and 
“harm” were grouped under “risk.” Qualitative data analysis software like Nvivo is useful to code the data and 
create visual coding maps (Nvivo, 2012). 
Table 1 illustrates the variety of cognitive dimensions that can emerge from the qualitative analysis of verbal 
protocols. Hodgkinson and Healey (2011) categorize cognition along two dimensions, ranging from intuitive to 
deliberative and from low to high affect. From the analysis of participants’ thought processes, we could capture 
cognition along these dimensions. For example, we found that participants recognized the role of luck and made 
intuitive decisions based on lucky numbers or a gist of where they may find oil. Most decisions participants made 
were more deliberative. Participants often referred to the risk of going to a new region in the landscape, which is 
why some chose to stay close to already discovered spots. Participants also spoke of rewards, deliberately as-
sessing the prospects of higher rewards or already accumulated rewards to make decisions. Some participants 
used a form of logic to make decisions. They perceived their decisions as logical and made them in a systematic 
way, for example, by attempting to establish a pattern of oil availabilities. Although we did not instruct partici-
pants to describe their emotions, some nonetheless expressed emotions such as happiness or sadness as they 
were deciding and receiving feedback. 
To further grasp these cognitive dimensions, we used the quantitative text-analysis software Linguistic In-
quiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015). The software analyzes text docu-
ments and reports how a document scores on over 90 pre-defined, validated categories such as analytical 
thinking and emotional tone. The developers first created the software in 1993 and validated and updated it over 
the years, adding new words and measures (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). The software con-
tains an internal dictionary of categories, each consisting of a number of words and word stems that reflect these 
categories. To calculate output scores, the software analyzes each word in a text document and looks for a 
match between that word and the words in its internal dictionary. If there is a match, the output score for the 
category that word represents is incremented. The total output score for a category shows the percentage of 
words in a text document that matches that category. LIWC also reports summary variables whose scores are 
calculated in comparison to standardized scores from the developers’ earlier published work (e.g., Cohn, Mehl, 
& Pennebaker, 2004; Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee, Lavergne, & Beaver, 2014). 
The software is useful to capture the deliberate side of cognition, but it also contains output scores that cap-
ture affect, such as the summary variable “emotional tone,” which reflects the positive emotion words (e.g., 
“good,” “nice”) and negative emotion words (e.g., “bad,” “angry”). As for the deliberate cognitive dimensions, the 
software reports output scores for the categories of risk and rewards. The scores indicate to what extent partici-
pants use words that match the risk and reward categories in the software. The risk category contains 103 words 
such as “danger” and “doubt.” The rewards category contains 120 words, including “take,” “prize,” and “benefit.” 
To capture to what extent participants relied on logic when making decisions, the software reports a summary 
variable “analytical thinking.” The LIWC scores can be used to complement or validate manual coding, support-
ing the identification of various dimensions of cognition. 
REPLICATING RESEARCH FINDINGS IN VARIOUS SAMPLES 
By adding cognitive dimensions derived from protocol and text analysis to the observation of realized behavior in 
an experiment, researchers can grasp cognition in action. Then the same experimental procedure can be repli-
cated to test the validity of research findings. 
As we illustrated, the physical board that we used during the oil-drilling task helped us identify and examine 
important decision-making processes underlying behavior in an ambiguous setting. The instrument is both inex-
pensive to create and easy to set up, allowing for easy replication in various settings, both in the lab and in the 
field. These features are particularly beneficial to replicate in populations that are not western, educated, indus-
trialized, rich, or democratic (WEIRD), populations about which we know far too little (Henrich, Heine, & No-
renzayan, 2010). 
Collecting experimental data using protocol analysis, with only one participant per session, can be time con-
suming. So, to facilitate replication—and extension—of these findings on a larger scale, we created a web-based 
version of the task, which was used without protocol analysis. This way, the mechanisms identified during lab 
sessions with protocol analysis can be tested in larger samples, as in non-student samples in artefactual field 
experiments (Harrison & List, 2004; Levitt & List, 2009) or online labor markets, such as Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, CrowdFlower, and Prolific Academic (Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & 
Acquisti, 2017). 
Conclusion 
We proposed that combining experiments with protocol analysis offers benefits that can advance the study of 
managerial and organizational cognition. We illustrated how this combination of methods can help researchers 
identify and examine a range of cognitive processes that can influence behavior in ambiguous settings. The 
findings can then be replicated and extended across populations, easily and cheaply. We suggest that this mix 
of methods offers a solution to three methodological challenges: capturing underlying processes, establishing 
causality, and ensuring validity. While experiments allow for the study of realized behavior and its causal effects, 
protocol analysis is a useful technique to simultaneously probe into underlying decision-making processes. This 
set of benefits is difficult to achieve using other methods. We suggest that experiments and protocol analysis 
can advance cognition research in important ways, especially to examine cognition in action, in a way that is rep-
licable. 
Note 
 1. Protocol analysis is related to “Think Aloud,” which Laureiro- 
Martinez discusses in another chapter in this volume. Here we adopt the term used by Ericsson and Simon (1984). 
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Appendix: Drill for Oil! Earn Money! 
In front of you is a large lot of land, represented by a board that is covered by identically colored (blue) notes. 
You are interested in what lies beneath—oil reservoirs—which are like underground lakes of oil, stretching over 
an area in a pattern. You will choose drilling locations to reach those reservoirs and capture as many oil barrels 
as possible. 
Some of the oil reservoirs may lay closer to the surface, easier to reach, and therefore more profitable. 
Some of them may lay deep underground, requiring more effort, and therefore less profitable. Some areas may 
be completely dry. 
Just by looking at the sand, you cannot know where oil reservoirs lie. The only way to find oil is by drilling. 
You will have the opportunity to drill once per round for 20 rounds. The more oil you find, the more money you 
will earn. 
In each round, choose a spot for drilling and place the marker on the spot. For example, if you want to drill in 
spot E19, place the marker on the intersection of row E and column 19. After you decide where to drill and place 
the marker there, the experimenter will reveal the outcome. The color under the sand indicates the profitability of 
drilling in that spot. We will give you a card showing the number of barrels you earned from the chosen spot. 
Remember that the reservoirs may form a pattern, so the amount of oil in one spot may be related to the 
amount of oil in its neighboring spots. For example, imagine that you first drilled in the bottom-left corner of the 
board. The spot above it may have a similar amount of oil, but not always. 
In each round, you may choose a different spot. You may also keep drilling in the same spot, which means 
that you will earn the same number of barrels. 
The locations and sizes of oil reservoirs are set before the game begins. During the game, the locations and 
the sizes are not affected by anyone’s actions and do not change. 
At the end of the game, the number of oil barrels you found will be converted to cash at a predetermined rate 
and paid to you. 
  
Fig. 1: An Oil Drilling Task. 
  
Fig. 2: A Measure of Risk (a) and Ambiguity (b). 
Table 1: Illustrative Cognitive Dimensions Derived from the Qualitative Analysis of Participants’ Verbal Reports. 
Cognitive Dimensions 
Luck I will see my luck for a couple of rounds and see if I can 
get some more oil. 
How about drilling location D13, because that is my 
lucky number and my name starts with a D. 
Risk Considering that there is no oil on the top, I don’t want 
to take much of a risk going there, a safer position 
would be J11. 
Finding a new oil location would be a risk, and I’d ra-
ther reap the benefit of what I’ve already found, so I’m 
thinking of digging again in the same spot. 
Rewards Now I want to take a chance because I’ve earned a lot 
of money so I want to go a bit further, but not much, 
J11. 
We can keep drilling in the same spot which means that I 
can earn the same amount of oil, so I would like to go 
with H11. So that my points increase, I would again go 
with I11. 
Logic This area seems to have a higher concentration of oil; I 
have three red spots, so the most logical choice should 
be O14.  
It is like a minesweeper game right now, oh nice, I got 
a good spot, so now F10, because logically it makes 
senses, to make sure that I am covering up the whole 
area, so that is done. 
Emotions I’m thinking that I’m having fun, is that ok? I am trying 
to understand how this works.  
I’m thinking that I’m happy I found a place that is more 
than 400. 
 
 
